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REAL-TIME AND HISTORIC LOCATION
SURVEILLANCE AFTER
UNITED STATES V. JONES:
AN ADMINISTRABLE, MILDLY MOSAIC
APPROACH
STEPHEN E. HENDERSON *
In United States v. Jones, the government took an extreme position: so
far as the federal Constitution is concerned, law enforcement can
surreptitiously electronically track the movements of any American over the
course of an entire month without cause or restraint. According to the
government, whether the surveillance is for good reason, invidious reason,
or no reason, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated. Fortunately, the
Supreme Court unanimously rejected that position. The Court did not,
however, resolve what restriction or restraint the Fourth Amendment places
upon location surveillance, reflecting proper judicial restraint in this
nuanced and difficult area. Using the newly enacted American Bar
Association (ABA) Standards on Law Enforcement Access to Third Party
Records, this Article develops a regulatory regime for law enforcement
visual surveillance, technologically enhanced location surveillance, and
access to historic location records (e.g., cell site data). The proposal
handles the administrative difficulties inherent in so-called mosaic
approaches via a generally permissive regime regulated through an abuse
standard. Ideally, such a proposal would be legislatively enacted with the
backdrop of constitutional judicial review, and the Article comments upon
*
Professor of Law, The University of Oklahoma College of Law. Yale Law School
(J.D., 1999); University of California at Davis (B.S., 1995). I am grateful to the Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology, and in particular to Symposium Editor Lily Katz, for the
invitation to participate in the Symposium, and for the hospitality during that event. I
continue to serve as Reporter for the American Bar Association Standards on Law
Enforcement Access to Third Party Records, the blackletter to which has been adopted but
the Commentary to which remains under development. Therefore, where I speak to the
Commentary I do so with a well-informed, but nonetheless single, opinion. I am grateful to
Jules Epstein, Susan Freiwald, Christopher Slobogin, and Andrew Taslitz for comments and
critiques on an earlier version of this Article.
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the need for constructive dialogue and initiative in that process by the law
enforcement community, a view influenced by six years serving as Reporter
for the ABA Standards.
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I. CELL TOWER DUMPS, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND PRIVACY
The aim of this Article is to develop an administrable set of regulations
for both historic and real-time law enforcement location surveillance. In
order to do that, it is critical to understand how and why law enforcement
might access such information. I therefore begin by describing a clever
investigation and the relevance of United States v. Jones, and then turn to
developing regulations.
A. THE HIGH COUNTRY BANDITS

Ronald Capito and Joel Glore, dubbed the “High Country Bandits,”
robbed sixteen banks in four states. 1 Their downfall was that they chose to
carry and use a tracking device during and near those robberies. Although
that sounds especially dumb, and it admittedly is not all that smart, most of
us carry such a device, and many of us carry one at almost all times: a
cellular phone. From among the victim banks, police selected several of the
1

Larry Hendricks, 18 Years in Prison for High Country Bandit, ARIZ. DAILY SUN (June
6, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://azdailysun.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/1b1634ee-8909-55
de-bf87-8e3962e29eaf.html. The two robbed banks in Arizona, Colorado, Utah, and New
Mexico. See id.; see also Larry Hendricks, FBI: ‘Bandits’ Gambled Away Loot, ARIZ.
DAILY SUN (Mar. 13, 2010, 5:15 AM), http://azdailysun.com/news/local/crime-andcourts/fbi-bandits-gambled-away-loot/article_1d7d6c24-4090-531b-9f50-d9b3d002c57f.html.
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more remote locations and gathered the phone records pertaining to the cell
towers nearest those banks at the relevant times. Using a computer, they
searched through the records, which pertained to 150,000 subscribers, and
found two phones were used at every location. One belonged to Capito,
and one belonged to Glore. 2
This was not the first time that accessing all records pertaining to
certain cell towers—known as “tower dumps”—has solved a string of bank
robberies, 3 and it is plainly good police work. Indeed, a similar basic
modus operandi appears to have been used in the investigation that resulted
in the resignation of CIA Director David Petraeus. 4 Such records access is
thus good police work, but it is also invasive of privacy. In the Petraeus
investigation, which reads like a soap opera, it is very easy to see the
personal ramifications. 5 In the investigation of the High Country Bandits,
the phone records of 150,000 persons were perused. Moreover, a cell
phone is in regular communication with the nearest cell tower anytime it is
2

Eric Betz, Bank ‘Bandit’ Pleads Guilty, ARIZ. DAILY SUN (Nov. 8, 2011, 9:00 AM),
http://azdailysun.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/bank-bandit-pleads-guilty/article_90aee
950-0b4c-59da-ac56-7a5869d1cab4.html.
3
The first use appears to be the apprehension of the so-called Scarecrow Bandits in
2008. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the N. Dist. of Tex., Federal Jury
Convicts Scarecrow Bandits on Bank Robbery and Firearm Offenses (Aug. 13, 2009),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/txn/PressRel09/scarecrow_bandits_convict_
pr.html. “The defendants were known as the Scarecrow Bandits by the FBI because they
wore loose, sometimes plaid, shirts and floppy hats during the first several of the 21
robberies they are believed to have committed.” Id. They turned to more paramilitary
tactics in later robberies. See id.; see also Government’s Response to Supplemental Motion
to Suppress Wiretap at 2, United States v. Hewitt, No. 3:08-CR-167-B (N.D. Tex. June 26,
2009) (“[T]he FBI obtained cell site ‘dump’ records for a dozen banks robbed by the
Scarecrow Bandits . . . . A ‘dump’ record reflects all of the cellular telephones that were
using the cell tower closest to the given bank at the time it was robbed . . . .”); Stephanie K.
Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward Reasonable Standards for
Law Enforcement Access to Location Data that Congress Could Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 117, 119–20 (2012) (describing this investigation and another using cell tower dumps).
4
FBI agents began with anonymous e-mails we now know to have been sent by
Petraeus’s jealous mistress and biographer, Paula Broadwell. See Michael Isikoff & Bob
Sullivan, Emails on ‘Coming and Goings’ of Petraeus, Other Military Officials Escalated
FBI Concerns, NBC NEWS (Nov. 12, 2012, 8:30 PM), http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_
news/2012/11/12/15119872-emails-on-coming-and-goings-of-petraeus-other-militaryofficials-escalated-fbi-concerns?lite. If, say, Broadwell had signed up for a Yahoo! e-mail
account using bogus personal information while using a hotel’s Internet service, the e-mail
could be traced back to that hotel via the Internet protocol address of that service. By
coordinating the locations from which multiple e-mails were sent with the guest lists at those
hotels or other providers, agents were able to track them to Broadwell—indeed, the locations
coincided with travel promoting her Petraeus biography, ironically titled All In. See id.; see
also PAULA BROADWELL, ALL IN: THE EDUCATION OF GENERAL DAVID PETRAEUS (2012).
5
See Scott Shane, Petraeus Case: Issue of Privacy Is in Play, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
2012, at A1.
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“active,” meaning anytime it is turned on.6 Were this not the case, it would
be impossible to receive a telephone call. And while providers today
typically only store location information when a call is in progress, they are
likely to begin more broadly storing the location of a phone anytime it is
active. 7 Thus, cellular phone providers will potentially possess a virtually
complete record of a customer’s location at all times, and that vast record
can be mined by police. 8
The reasonable question, therefore, is what restraints or regulations the
law should place upon such access. In the investigation of the High
Country Bandits, a court order was used to obtain the cellular records, and
police selected the most rural bank locations “in order to minimize the
amount of extraneous telephone data that would likely be obtained.”9 Once
police searched those records and located two phone numbers of interest,
they proceeded to obtain further record information.
For the first telephone number, police could have subpoenaed the
subscriber’s identifying information from the telephone provider.10 But
because they also wanted to acquire further transactional records pertaining
to the phone, they probably used a single “specific and articulable facts”
court order. 11 They learned that this phone was registered to Capito. 12 The
second number was assigned to a prepaid phone, meaning the subscriber
was not required to provide identifying information or, at least, accurate
identifying information. Fortunately for police, Glore was accommodating
and upon purchase had provided his name and date of birth.13 The acquired
6
See ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies and Services:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary [hereinafter Location Based Technologies Hearing], 111th Cong.
12–14 (2010) (testimony of Professor Matt Blaze).
7
See id. at 16, 27, 95. The accuracy of that location will also continue to increase. See
id. at 15, 20, 26–27, 30, 95; see also Finding the Way Inside, ECONOMIST, Dec. 1, 2012, at
18 (describing new mobile phone technologies that, unlike GPS, enable tracking location
within buildings).
8
A historic record also permits accurate prediction. One study using mobile phone data
found that location is 93% predictable. Chaoming Song et al., Limits of Predictability in
Human Mobility, 327 SCIENCE 1018, 1020 (2010), available at http://www.barabasilab.com/
pubs/CCNR-ALB_Publications/201002-19_Science-Predictability/201002-19_SciencePredictability.pdf; see also Dr. Seldon, I Presume, ECONOMIST, Feb. 23, 2013, at 76. In the
words of the study, “a historical record of the daily mobility pattern of the users hides an
unexpectedly high degree of potential predictability.” Song, supra, at 1020.
9
Criminal Complaint at 13, United States v. Capito, No. 3:10-CR-08050-NVW (D. Ariz.
Mar. 12, 2010).
10
See id. at 14–15 (identifying the phone number and provider); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(c)(2) (2006).
11
See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(B), (d).
12
See Criminal Complaint, supra note 9, at 15.
13
Id.
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call detail records for both phones—noting when calls were placed or
received and at what geographic location—corroborated the police’s
suspicion. 14
Police conducted physical searches and further records searches. 15 As
for records, police used Google and Internet databases of property records,
and obtained records held by the commercial data aggregator and broker
ChoicePoint, 16 a motor vehicle department, courts, casinos, hotels, and a
gas station. 17 From this single investigation it is evident that records access
is vitally important to effective law enforcement, and extremely
commonplace. Records access can solve a murder, as when police caught a
serial killer by tracing a map he generated online.18 And records access can
defuse an emergency, as when police tracked the location of a cell phone
from which a sister had received a chilling message: “The girl with this
phone is dead . . . .” 19
Once again, the reasonable question is therefore what restraints or
regulations should be placed upon law enforcement records access. Perhaps
some people believe that law enforcement access should not be regulated:
we should entirely trust our privacy to the integrity of police officers.
14
See id. at 15–16. The two phones “were either in very close proximity to each of
the . . . sixteen bank robberies on the date and near the time of each robbery or the
telephones can be documented traveling between the general area of [the suspects’
hometown] to or from the general area of each bank during the respective time frame of each
robbery.” Id. at 16.
15
Searches of Capito’s and Glore’s residences and vehicles located significant
incriminating information, and while Capito “lawyered up,” Gore confessed. See id. at 28–
31.
16
ChoicePoint was subsequently purchased by LexisNexis. See Acquisition of
ChoicePoint Inc. Completed, REED ELSEVIER, http://www.reedelsevier.com/mediacentre/
pressreleases/2008/Pages/AcquisitionofChoicePointIncCompleted.aspx (last visited Apr. 10,
2013); Risk Solutions, LEXISNEXIS, http://www.lexisnexis.com/risk/ (last visited Mar. 18,
2013).
17
See Criminal Complaint, supra note 9, at 20–25.
18
See Stephanie Simon, Virtual Trail Led to Serial Killer Suspect, L.A. TIMES, June 17,
2002, at A8.

[I]n response to a federal subpoena, Expedia.com was able to pull up the IP address of every user
who had looked at a West Alton map in recent days. As it turned out, there was only one: IP
65.227.106.78. The user assigned to that number had clicked to zoom in on West Alton 10
times—until the map on his screen looked exactly like the version sent to the [newspaper].

Id.; see also Tim O’Neil, Police Tie Man to at Least 12 Killings, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
June 25, 2002, at B1.
19
See Rocco Parascandola & Sarah Armaghan, Queens Woman Who Vanished Sunday
Found Alive and Well in Texas, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 12, 2012, 8:58 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/queens-woman-vanished-sunday-found-alive-texasarticle-1.1113459. Fortunately, it seems the missing sister ran away to escape plans for an
arranged marriage, rather than suffered a violent demise. See id.
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Perhaps some people believe that law enforcement access should be highly
regulated: we should place a neutral and detached magistrate between
citizens and the officer engaged in the “competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime,” 20 and that magistrate should make a demanding substantive
inquiry before permitting access. Perhaps some people believe that law
enforcement access should be constitutionally regulated, meaning the
source of this regulation should be the federal and/or state constitution.
Perhaps some people believe the source should be statutory. When one
considers the diversity of records information, reasonable people, I submit,
believe there should be some constitutional regulation, some statutory
regulation, and some things left to officer integrity. The details of specific
regulations applying to particular types of information will be contested and
difficult. But those details are worth working out because the binary
alternatives—either zero regulation or “total” regulation—are completely
unacceptable. We require legislative differential regulation, by which I
mean a hierarchy of regulation proportional to privacy, yet responsive to
law enforcement needs, subject to a constitutional backstop.
B. THE RELEVANCE OF UNITED STATES V. JONES

This need for regulation is why United States v. Jones 21 was a
unanimous decision as to the prevailing party. The government took an
egregious position, namely that law enforcement can surreptitiously
electronically track the movements of any American over the course of an
entire month without any Fourth Amendment restraint.22 In this instance
the tracking was via a GPS device attached to the defendant’s vehicle, but
as I have described, that same information could be obtained from thirdparty records. And it was not difficult for the Justices to recognize that
such tracking could be used against them. At oral argument, Justice
Roberts asked just that.23 Now that technology has removed the formerly
significant resource restraints on tracking location, it is possible to track all
of us. But it was more than self-interest that generated a nine-to-zero loss
for the government. It was the common sense that in a free and democratic
society, and one in which at least some law enforcement abuse has been
known to occur, 24 law enforcement should not be permitted to engage in
20

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
22
Id. at 951.
23
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 9–10, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012)
(No. 10-1259), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_trans
cripts/10-1259.pdf.
24
See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 180, 183–85 (2004); Editorial, Backward at the F.B.I.: Overreaching
21
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such long-term tracking without restraint.
What restraint did the Justices select, at least as to the GPS tracking
before the Court? Not a single Justice answered this question. Justice
Scalia, writing for a majority of five, focused on the installation of the GPS
device and held that a trespass to a constitutionally protected person, house,
paper, or effect in order to obtain information constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search, thus resurrecting the pre-Katz trespass- or propertybased Fourth Amendment. 25 But the Court did not decide whether a
warrant or some other judicial preclearance was necessary, or what
quantum of suspicion was required for that search to be reasonable.26
Justice Alito, writing for a concurring four, instead held that the long-term
electronic monitoring of location constitutes a search because it invades a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 27 And Justice Sotomayor, who joined
the majority, also wrote a separate concurrence agreeing with Alito.28 So
we have two conceptions of Fourth Amendment search, both of which were
satisfied, but no answer as to what law enforcement must know or do before
conducting that search.29
This lack of guidance is not surprising, not only because the
government had not argued the issue—thinking nothing necessary to justify
its actions—but also because that guidance is difficult. Two terms before,
the Court punted when it came to the Fourth Amendment regulation of
another type of record—text messages in the hands of a service provider. 30
And in Jones, Alito stressed what Professor Daniel Solove and others have
argued, which is that it would be ideal for legislatures to take a first stab at
New Rules for Surveillance Threaten Americans’ Basic Rights, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2011, at
WK7; F.B.I. Obtained Reporters’ Phone Records, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2008, at A15; Mark
Mazzetti & Eric Lichtblau, Pentagon Review Faults Demands for Bank Records, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 14, 2007, at A28; John O’Neil, F.B.I. Director Is Bombarded by Stinging
Questions at Senate Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2006, at A23; Julian Sanchez,
Wiretapping’s True Danger, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, at M9; Charlie Savage, F.B.I.
Violated Rules in Obtaining Phone Records, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, at A25;
Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Letter to the Editor, Rights Abuses by the F.B.I.: A Look at the
History, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2010, at A30; Scott Shane, Senators Cite F.B.I. Failures as
Chief Promises Change, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2007, at A16.
25
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950–52. For further description of the Court’s opinions, see
Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment Third
Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2013).
26
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954.
27
See id. at 962–64 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
28
See id. at 954–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
29
See State v. Brereton, 826 N.W.2d 369, 381 (Wis. 2013) (requiring warrant for vehicle
location tracking); State v. Zahn, 812 N.W.2d 490, 499 (S.D. 2012) (same); United States v.
Ortiz, 878 F. Supp. 2d. 515, 536–37 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (same).
30
See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629–30 (2010) (assuming a reasonable
expectation of privacy).
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these complicated questions, after which courts can review whether those
solutions meet the constitutional floor. 31
I can personally attest to the difficulty of articulating guidance. For
the past six years, I have served as Reporter for a new set of ABA Criminal
Justice Standards, entitled Law Enforcement Access to Third Party Records
(LEATPR). The ABA process is appropriately thorough and rigorous,
consisting of several stages at which all interested parties have a voice.32 In
February 2012, the ABA House of Delegates approved consensus
blackletter standards.33
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows: First, the initial
portions of Part II consider how the ABA LEATPR Standards treat law
enforcement access to location information, and more generally how
legislatures and courts should regulate such access (Parts II.A and II.B).
Given that law enforcement requested some information from cell phone
providers over 1.3 million times in 2011, 34 and given Jones, consideration
of this specific type of record is especially timely. I conclude that absent
consent or an emergency, the following would be reasonable: law
enforcement would need a warrant to access over twenty-four hours of
location information, could access a lesser period of location information
using a lesser court order, and could access a record indicating location at a
single point in time for any legitimate law enforcement purpose. Part II.C
briefly considers some lingering issues regarding the probable cause
required to obtain a location warrant, after which Part II.D considers the
difficulties inherent in any “mosaic” approach that differentiates access
regulation by amount. I resolve these difficulties by typically not requiring
police to consider past requests, but punishing abuse of the lesser process.
Applying this structure to the investigation of the High Country Bandits
implicates another powerful aspect of the LEATPR Standards (Part II.E),
and Part II.F therefore explains and applies the Standards’ incorporation of
31
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); Daniel J. Solove,
Essay, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1515, 1535–37 (2010).
32
See Martin Marcus, The Making of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards: Forty Years
of Excellence, 23 CRIM. JUST. 10 (2009), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_magazine/makingofstandards_marcus.authcheckdam.
pdf.
33
See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY
RECORDS (2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/
criminal_justice_standards/Black_Letter.authcheckdam.pdf.
34
See Eric Lichtblau, More Demands on Cell Carriers in Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, July
9, 2012, at A1; Press Release, Congressman Ed Markey, Markey: Law Enforcement
Collecting Information on Millions of Americans from Mobile Phone Carriers (July 9,
2012), available at http://markey.house.gov/press-release/markey-law-enforcementcollecting-information-millions-americans-mobile-phone-carriers.
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de-identification. Part III then considers real-time location surveillance,
which is outside the scope of the Standards but nonetheless influenced by
their guidance. I propose regulation that is analogous to that for records
access except that it must acknowledge the realities of police patrols.
Finally, Part IV comments on the importance of forthright and open
dialogue to the process of regulating law enforcement access.
II. LOCATION RECORDS UNDER THE ABA LEATPR STANDARDS
In February 2012, the ABA House of Delegates approved a twentyfifth volume in its Criminal Justice Standards entitled Law Enforcement
Access to Third Party Records. 35 A background Report to the Standards
was submitted to the House of Delegates and is currently available, 36 and
very extensive commentary is being drafted. Because the interested reader
can turn to those sources, I will provide only a brief summary.
A. OVERVIEW OF THE STANDARDS

The Standards consist of seven Parts: I. Definitions; II. Scope;
III. General Principles; IV. Categorization of Information and Protection;
V. Access to Records; VI. Retention, Maintenance, and Disclosure of
Records; and VII. Accountability. The four principles of Part III nicely
summarize the “why” and the “what” of the Standards. In essence, (1)
modern third parties maintain easily searchable records containing vast
amounts of personal information,37 (2) access to those records can be
essential to law enforcement functions, 38 (3) such law enforcement access
35

CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY
RECORDS (2012).
36
AM. BAR ASS’N, BACKGROUND REPORT TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY RECORDS (2012), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/
Memo_House.authcheckdam.pdf.
37
Standard 25-3.1 provides:
Institutional third parties maintain records ranging from the most mundane to those chronicling
the most personal aspects of people’s lives, and when those records are stored digitally, access
and distribution costs are diminished. These records include such things as the content of
communications; medical diagnoses, treatments, and conditions; Internet browsings; financial
transactions; physical locations; bookstore and library purchases, loans, and browsings; other
store purchases and browsings; and media viewing preferences.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS
§ 25-3.1.
38
Standard 25-3.2 provides:

TO

THIRD PARTY RECORDS

Obtaining records maintained by institutional third parties can facilitate, and indeed be essential
to, the detection, investigation, prevention and deterrence of crime; the safety of citizens and law
enforcement officers; and the apprehension and prosecution of criminals; and can be the least
confrontational means of obtaining needed evidence.
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can infringe privacy and chill fundamental freedoms, 39 and therefore (4)
decisionmakers should carefully consider how best to regulate that access.40
Hence, the Standards “relate to law enforcement investigatory access
to, and storage and disclosure of, records maintained by institutional third
parties.” 41 Location information residing with a cell phone service provider
is thus squarely within the Standards, as an institutional third party is
defined to include “any nongovernmental entity.” 42
The Standards do not suggest a particular regulation for given types of
information. Although, everything else being equal, more specific guidance
is always better, over the six years of work it became clear not only that
there are a range of reasonable opinions when it comes to this ultimate
question, but also that those opinions will vary by local experience and
need, and that both the law and technology are very much in a state of flux.
Therefore, as noted in Standard 3.4, the Standards provide a framework, or
algorithm, via which the appropriate decisionmaker—for example, a
legislature—can determine precisely what regulation to place upon a
particular type of law enforcement access. Before the passage of the
Standards, there was no framework for making these determinations. While
there is significant collective wisdom in the many existing statutes, court
opinions, and administrative rules regulating law enforcement access to
record information, it is scattered, causing rules to at times be ad hoc,
confusing, and inconsistent. 43 The Standards’ framework thus provides
Id. § 25-3.2.
39
Standard 25-3.3 provides:
Law enforcement acquisition of records maintained by institutional third parties can infringe the
privacy of those whose information is contained in the records; chill freedoms of speech,
association, and commerce; and deter individuals from seeking medical, emotional, physical or
other assistance for themselves or others.

Id. § 25-3.3.
40
Standard 25-3.4 provides:
Legislatures, courts that may act in a supervisory capacity, and administrative agencies should
therefore carefully consider regulations on law enforcement access to and use of records
maintained by institutional third parties. These standards provide a framework for that
consideration.

Id. § 25-3.4.
41
Id. § 25-2.1.
42
Id. § 25-1.1(e). “A ‘record’ contains information, whether maintained in paper,
electronic, or other form, that is linked, or is linkable through reasonable efforts, to an
identifiable person.” Id. § 25-1.1(g).
43
For example, we have relatively strong protection for video rental records because the
rental habits of Judge Bork happened to become an issue during his confirmation hearings.
See Somini Sengupta, Hulu Faces a Privacy Test in Federal Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20,
2012, at B4; Natasha Singer, Put It on My Marquee: I Just Watched ‘Creepshow 2,’ N.Y.
Times, Dec. 11, 2011, at BU3; Natasha Singer, Technology Outpaces Privacy (Yet Again),
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much needed guidance to those confronting these complex problems.
Although application will at times be unavoidably difficult, the
Standards’ operation is straightforward. A decisionmaker first considers
the privacy level of a given type of information, in this case location
information. This requires considering a few things. Why is this
information in the hands of the third party? 44 Is that transfer something we
need to be wary of chilling? How personal is the information?45 Will its
access tend to be embarrassing or stigmatizing? Is the information being
accessed by others? 46 Does existing law speak to the access of this or
similar information? 47 Together these considerations dictate how private is
a type of information. For example, where on the spectrum of privacy does
location information fall?
Is location information highly private,
moderately private, minimally private, or not private? In other words, are
we talking large, medium, small, or nothing at all? 48
That privacy sets a threshold for law enforcement access, just as the
privacy of a home sets the Fourth Amendment standard for entering at a
warrant supported by probable cause. When there is no emergency, the
nonconsensual entry into a home requires a warrant.49 And other than on
the extreme margins, the Fourth Amendment does not differentiate between
“serious” and “petty” crimes with respect to this warrant requirement.50
Nor does the law ease the warrant requirement when crime rates go up or
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2010, at BU3. And we seemingly have more significant regulation for
historic access to communication transactional information than for real-time access. See 18
U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(B), (d) (2006) (requiring a “specific and articulable facts” court order
for historic records); id. § 3123(a)(1) (requiring prosecutor certification of relevance for realtime access).
44
See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY
RECORDS § 25-4.1(a).
45
See id. § 25-4.1(b).
46
See id. § 24-4.1(c).
47
See id. § 24-4.1(d).
48
Why four categories, and not three or five? As Anthony Amsterdam cogently
observed many years ago, there is no perfect number because “any number of categories,
however shaped, is too few to encompass life and too many to organize it manageably.”
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 377
(1974). There is an unavoidable tradeoff between nuance and administrability.
49
See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
50
See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 (1984) (prohibiting warrantless entry for a
nonjailable traffic offense); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 335–36 (2001)
(distinguishing Welsh for a jailable narcotics offense); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532
U.S. 318, 348–49 (2001) (questioning more generally the administrability of such
distinctions and therefore rejecting a differential Fourth Amendment based upon them as to
warrantless arrests in public). For a general discussion of the pitfalls in considering
magnitude of crime under the Fourth Amendment, see Christopher Slobogin, Why Crime
Severity Analysis Is Not Reasonable, 97 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 1 (2012).
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when a novel crime is first practiced. Hence, under the Standards, records
containing highly private information default to being highly protected,
records containing moderately private information default to being
moderately protected, and records containing minimally private information
Absent consent 52 or an
default to being minimally protected. 51
53
emergency, accessing records containing highly protected information
requires a probing judicial authorization (a judicial determination of
probable cause), 54 accessing records containing moderately protected
information requires a lesser judicial authorization, 55 accessing records
containing minimally protected information requires a prosecutorial or
administrative subpoena, 56 and accessing unprotected records is permissible
upon officer request for any legitimate law enforcement purpose.57
However, these threshold regulations are subject to a caveat. Law
enforcement is understandably concerned that restricting access to certain
records could make it markedly more difficult to perform its essential
functions.
And while accessing third-party records has very real
implications for privacy, and privacy has very real implications for our
fundamental rights, accessing records does not have the immediate danger
to life and limb present in physical searches of suspects or their property.
Thus, there is a safety valve:
If the [default] limitation . . . would render law enforcement unable to solve or prevent
an unacceptable amount of otherwise solvable or preventable crime, such that the
benefits of respecting privacy are outweighed by this social cost, a legislature may
consider reducing, to the limited extent necessary to correct this imbalance, the level
58
of protection for that type of information.

It is critical that these two decisions—how private the information is
and then how protected it should be—are kept separate and sequential. If
they are conflated, the more amorphous but equally important privacy
51

See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY
RECORDS § 24-4.2.
52
See id. § 25-5.1.
53
See id. § 25-5.4.
54
See id. § 25-5.3(a)(i). The Standards also acknowledge the historically favored role of
a grand jury subpoena, even though this is substantively questionable given the effectively
total prosecutorial discretion. Standard 25-2.1(c) carves from the Standards’ scope “access
to records via a grand jury subpoena, or in jurisdictions where grand juries are typically not
used, a functionally equivalent prosecutorial subpoena.”
55
See id. § 25-5.3(a)(ii). This Standard recognizes a judicial determination of reasonable
suspicion, a judicial determination of relevance, and a prosecutorial certification of
relevance. See id. § 25-5.2(a)(ii)–(iv).
56
See id. § 25-5.3(a)(iii).
57
See id. § 25-5.3(d).
58
Id. § 25-4.2(b).
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interests are almost surely to be unfairly discounted.
There is much more to the Standards, some of which will be
considered below, but this explains their general structure.
A
decisionmaker engages in a three-step process: (1) How private is this type
of information? (2) What restriction should that dictate? (3) Despite the
general wisdom of those first two steps, would that restriction on accessing
this particular type of record information be more harmful than beneficial?
B. APPLICATION TO LOCATION INFORMATION

Armed with a general understanding of the LEATPR Standards, we
can turn to the specific inquiry of interest: what should be the restriction on
law enforcement access to location records residing with cell phone
providers? We know a decisionmaker must determine how private such
information is, which requires analyzing the factors described above. And
“[i]n making that determination, a legislature, court, or administrative
agency should consider present and developing technology.” 59 Technology
has progressed such that these records can pinpoint location very
accurately, and that accuracy will continue to increase as, among other
changes, more cell towers are added to provider networks. 60
The first privacy factor is the extent to which “the initial transfer of
such information to an institutional third party is reasonably necessary to
participate meaningfully in society or in commerce, or is socially beneficial,
including to freedom of speech and association.”61 While I will leave a full
discussion of these factors to the much more expansive Standards
Commentary, this factor recognizes that sharing is relevant to privacy, but
also that information privacy—which is fundamentally about control—is
divisible and is not limited to secrecy. 62 Moreover, where a transfer is
conducive to other values, especially constitutionally enshrined ones like
the freedom of speech and association, the law should be wary of chilling
that transfer. In the words of Justice Sotomayor, “Awareness that the
government may be watching chills associational and expressive
freedoms.” 63
In order to use a mobile telephone, a customer must communicate his
or her location to the service provider; without this information, the
59

Id. § 25-4.1.
See Location Based Technologies Hearing, supra note 6, at 15, 20, 26–27, 30, 95
(testimony of Matt Blaze).
61
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY
RECORDS § 25-4.1(a).
62
See Stephen E. Henderson, Expectations of Privacy in Social Media, 31 MISS. C. L.
REV. 227, 232–33 (2012).
63
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
60
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provider would be unable to send and receive calls. Mobile telephony
contributes to the freedoms of expression and association, but for many
years its contribution arguably was tempered by the ready availability of,
and heavy reliance upon, traditional landline telephones. But as mobile
phone usage increases and the use of landlines correspondingly decreases,
particularly among certain demographics, this has changed. 64 Not only do
87% of American adults own a mobile phone,65 but 46% are users of the
more sophisticated smartphones. 66 Protestors use their mobile phones to
communicate with interested parties, 67 and concerned citizens use them to
record possible police abuse. 68 People increasingly use their phones to
obtain navigation directions and to locate nearby businesses or other
locations of interest. 69 In refusing to decide the Fourth Amendment status
of what are now essentially obsolete pager communications, the Supreme
Court noted the following: “Cell phone and text message communications
are so pervasive that some persons may consider them to be essential means
or necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-identification. That
might strengthen the case for an expectation of privacy.” 70
The second privacy factor is the extent to which “such information is
personal, including the extent to which it is intimate and likely to cause
embarrassment or stigma if disclosed, and whether outside of the initial
transfer to an institutional third party it is typically disclosed only within
one’s close social network, if at all.” 71 Limited location information is
routinely provided to countless passersby, is stored in innumerable records
64

There are over 285 million active wireless subscriber accounts in the United States.
See In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827,
834 (S.D. Tex. 2010). By 2010, they accounted for over 2.2 trillion minutes of use and 1.56
trillion text messages. Id. at 835.
65
Trend Data (Adults), PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, http://pewinternet.org/
Trend-Data-%28Adults%29/Device-Ownership.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2013) (citing
statistics as of December 2012).
66
Aaron Smith, Nearly Half of American Adults Are Smartphone Owners, PEW INTERNET
& AM. LIFE PROJECT (Mar. 1, 2012), http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2012/SmartphoneUpdate-2012.aspx.
67
See Russ Buettner, Judge Orders Twitter to Turn Over Protester’s Messages, N.Y.
TIMES, July 3, 2012, at A17; Jennifer Preston, Protesters Look for Ways to Feed the Web,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2011, at A28.
68
See Eunice Lee, Watching the Watchmen: ACLU Offers Citizens ‘Stealth’ App to
Record Cops, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), July 3, 2012, at 1, 7; The App Place: Police
Tape, AM. C.L. UNION OF N.J., http://www.aclu-nj.org/yourrights/the-app-place/ (last visited
Mar. 18, 2013).
69
See John R. Quain, Getting Lost with a Cellphone, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2009, at A10.
70
City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010).
71
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY
RECORDS § 25-4.1(b) (2012).
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(e.g., a store receipt), and tells relatively little about a person. But location
over a significant period “reveals an intimate picture of the subject’s life
that he expects no one to have—short perhaps of his spouse.” 72 In the
words of the New York Court of Appeals in the context of law enforcement
location tracking:
The whole of a person’s progress through the world, into both public and private
spatial spheres, can be charted and recorded over lengthy periods . . . . Disclosed in
the data . . . will be trips the indisputably private nature of which takes little
imagination to conjure: trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion
clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the bythe-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and
on and on. What the technology yields and records with breathtaking quality and
quantity is a highly detailed profile, not simply of where we go, but by easy inference,
of our associations—political, religious, amicable and amorous, to name only a few—
73
and of the pattern of our professional and avocational pursuits.

The third privacy factor is the extent to which “such information is
accessible to and accessed by non-government persons outside the
institutional third party.” 74 This factor will very often be neutral. One of
the reasons we consider information personal (the preceding privacy factor)
is because we know it is not routinely accessed, and where it is routinely
accessed, it is typically not considered personal. But there may be instances
in which the type of information is personal—it is intimate and social
norms typically keep such information within one’s social network—but
nonetheless certain such information is not only accessible to, but is
routinely accessed by, persons having no authorization from the person to
whom the information relates. 75 In that case, law enforcement need not
alone shield its eyes. With respect to cell phone location information, I am
not aware of any such relevant access.
The fourth and final privacy factor is the extent to which “existing law,
including the law of privilege, restricts or allows access to and
dissemination of such information or of comparable information.” 76
Although it is the raison d’être of the Standards that decisionmakers should
judiciously reconsider existing rules under the Standards’ framework, it
would be foolhardy to do so without regard to what has come before.
72

United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding
unconstitutional the prolonged warrantless GPS monitoring of a vehicle), aff’d sub nom.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
73
People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199–1200 (N.Y. 2009).
74
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY
RECORDS § 25-4.1(c).
75
An example might be salaries for those working at a public institution.
76
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY
RECORDS § 25-4.1(d).
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While it may be that existing restrictions are either too lenient or too
demanding, it may also be that they are ideal.
The federal constitutional law regarding law enforcement access to
location information is currently in flux. From United States v. Jones we
know that installing a GPS device on a vehicle is a Fourth Amendment
search, 77 and that five Justices also believe that thereby obtaining long-term
location information constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.78 But while
the privacy intrusion is identical, the Court has not yet had occasion to
address to what extent its reasoning applies to accessing location
information in the form of third-party records; only Justice Sotomayor
spoke to records access in Jones. 79 Thus, we can expect to see
disagreement among the lower courts. 80 Several state constitutions require
a warrant for law enforcement location tracking, 81 but we once again lack
opinions on historic access.
The federal statutory law regarding law enforcement access to thirdparty location information is a mess, both as to prospective access and
historic access. One must interpret several complicated statutes that were
written without an understanding of this modern technology. 82 The Third
77

132 S. Ct. 945, 949–53 (2012).
Id. at 957–64 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 955–56 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring); cf. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777–81 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that
there is no Fourth Amendment restraint on law enforcement tracking a mobile phone in real
time over several days).
79
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). On remand the government
has sought to rely upon cell site location information, so the Jones case may yet answer that
question. See Mike Scarcella, DOJ: No Privacy Rights in Cell Phone Tower Data, BLOG OF
LEGAL TIMES (Sept. 5, 2012, 3:23 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2012/09/doj-noprivacy-rights-in-cell-phone-tower-data-.html. To date, however, the district court has
avoided the question by relying upon the good-faith exception. See United States v. Jones,
No. 05-0386 (ESH), 2012 WL 6443136, at *2, *17–19 (D.D.C. Dec. 14, 2012).
80
See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 389 (D. Md. 2012) (holding
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in historic cell site location information despite
Jones, and collecting relevant supporting and conflicting case law); In re Application of the
United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 846 (S.D. Tex. 2010)
(disagreeing) (currently on appeal before the Fifth Circuit).
81
People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1201–02 (N.Y. 2009); State v. Campbell, 759
P.2d 1040, 1049 (Or. 1988); State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 224 (Wash. 2003).
82
As to prospective access to cell site location information, the Department of Justice
tries to combine a certification order under the prospective Pen Trap Statute with a
reasonable suspicion order under the retrospective Stored Communications Act, a solution
that some courts accept and others do not. See COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND
OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 159–61 (2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ssmanual2009.pdf. As to historic access,
DOJ relies solely upon the noncontent provisions of the Stored Communications Act, again
with mixed success. See id. at 122; infra notes 83–85.
78
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Circuit, for example, has held that the statutes permit a magistrate to choose
whether to require a warrant for access to historic cell site location
information, 83 while other courts disagree, 84 and the issue is currently
before the Fifth Circuit. 85 There are federal restrictions on a mobile phone
provider choosing to disclose location information.86 And we can expect to
see more legislation in the near future. Bills introduced in several states
and in Congress would restrict law enforcement access, 87 and the California
legislature overwhelmingly supported a bill that would typically require a
warrant to obtain historic location information, but the Governor vetoed it. 88
Given (1) that location information must necessarily be provided in
order to use a mobile phone, (2) that mobile phones are becoming
increasingly pervasive in the discourses of society, (3) that individually
location information is often shared but collectively location information is
highly personal and almost never shared outside of the necessary transfer to
the provider, (4) that such information is not accessed by others, and (5)
that—while far too confusing—existing legal protections are significant, I
could imagine a decisionmaker deciding the following: Location at a single
point in time is not private, a relatively short period of location information
(say up to twenty-four hours) is moderately private, and anything longer is
highly private. This is of course not the only solution, but it strikes me as a
reasonable one. As for a single datum of location information, the
83
See In re Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 319 (3d Cir. 2010). For a
thorough explanation of the issues in this case and location tracking more generally, see
Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law,
Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681 (2011).
84
See In re Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 600 n.42 (W.D. Pa.
2008) (collecting cases).
85
See In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F.
Supp. 2d 827 (S.D. Tex. 2010); Jeffrey Brown, Fifth Circuit to Hear Cell Site Data Case
Tuesday, CYBERCRIME REVIEW (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.cybercrimereview.com/2012/10/
fifth-circuit-to-hear-cell-site-data.html.
86
See 47 U.S.C. § 222(f) (2006). For relevant legislative history and analysis, see In re
Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 841–43.
87
See Somini Sengupta, Courts Divided over Searches of Cellphones: Privacy Act
Reviewed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2012, at A1.
88
See S.B. 1434, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012); James Temple, Brown Vetoes
Bill on Location Privacy, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 4, 2012, at D3. The Assembly approved the bill
by a vote of 63–11 and the Senate by a vote of 33–3. See Complete Bill History, Bill
Number: S.B. No. 1434, OFFICIAL CAL. LEGIS. INFO., http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/
bill/sen/sb_1401-1450/sb_1434_bill_20120930_history.html (last visited May 27, 2013); see
also SB 1434, AROUND THE CAPITOL, http://www.aroundthecapitol.com/Bills/SB_1434/
20112012/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2013). Similar legislation has been introduced in Congress.
See H.R. 6529, 112th Cong. (2012).
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potentially many people who observe a person know that person’s location,
and many records, including any store receipt, contain that information. On
the other hand, presence at certain locations can be very personal, and we
often do not take notice of the others present, and if we do, we typically
quickly forget. So I could understand a categorization of either minimally
private or not private, but for sake of argument I will choose not private. 89
If so, the threshold protection would be that a single datum of location
information is not protected, a day or less of location information is
moderately protected, and more than a day of location information is highly
protected. An invocation of the Standards’ “safety valve,” by which highly
private information could be given lower protection,90 would depend upon a
demonstrated law enforcement need, a topic to which I will return shortly.
Absent that lowering, and absent consent, 91 emergency aid, 92 and exigent
circumstances, 93 law enforcement access to more than a day of location
information would require “a judicial determination that there is probable
cause to believe the information in the record contains or will lead to
evidence of crime.” 94 Law enforcement access to a day or less of location
information would require one of three options: (1) “a judicial
determination that there is reasonable suspicion to believe the information
in the record contains or will lead to evidence of crime,” 95 (2) “a judicial
determination that the record is relevant to an investigation,” 96 or (3) “a
prosecutorial certification that the record is relevant to an investigation.” 97
In other words, it would be entirely consistent with the Standards for a

89
If a decisionmaker were to consider location at a single point in time to be minimally
private, the Standard 25-4.2(b) escape valve might be used to lessen the protection. While
there might be good reason to independently regulate access to certain types of store
receipts, without a decrease in protection, access to all store receipts would be regulated,
which might be a significant impediment to initial law enforcement investigation.
90
See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY
RECORDS § 25-4.2(b) (2012); supra note 58 and accompanying text.
91
See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY
RECORDS § 25-5.1.
92
See id. § 25-5.4. “‘Emergency aid’ is government conduct intended to eliminate or
mitigate what is reasonably believed to be imminent danger of death or serious physical
injury.” Id. § 25-1.1(a).
93
See id. § 25-5.4. “‘Exigent circumstances’ are circumstances in which there is
probable cause to fear imminent destruction of evidence or imminent flight.” Id. § 25-1.1(b).
94
Id. § 25-5.2(a)(i). A decisionmaker can decide to impose even greater restrains upon
access to highly protected information, but that is expected to be rare in the records context.
See id. § 25-5.3(b).
95
Id. § 25-5.2(a)(ii).
96
Id. § 25-5.2(a)(iii).
97
Id. § 25-5.2(a)(iv).
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legislature to select any of these three restrictions.98 Law enforcement
access to location information for a single point in time would be
permissible for any legitimate law enforcement purpose. 99
In the interest of brevity, I will not address the LEATPR Standards’
postaccess provisions in this Article. The Standards are comprehensive,
addressing not only law enforcement access to a record, but also notice of
that access, along with the retention, maintenance, and disclosure of that
record. For example, under the assumptions above, the Standards would
require that law enforcement ultimately notify the cell phone customer of
any access beyond a single point in time, regardless of whether the duration
was less than or greater than one day. 100 Such notice would be a significant
improvement to federal law. 101
C. PROBABLE CAUSE OF WHAT?

Before turning to the administrability of the LEATPR Standards’
regime, it is worth pointing out that more work should be done regarding
just what constitutes relevance, reasonable suspicion, and probable cause.
Although these terms have been part of the criminal procedure lexicon for
years, they are surprisingly ill developed. Professor Andrew Taslitz has just
recently begun the task of grappling with their meaning in the records
context. 102
Consider the Standards’ language for highly protected records, which
requires “a judicial determination that there is probable cause to believe the
information in the record contains or will lead to evidence of crime.” 103
98

Others have proposed different solutions. See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 3, at 180–
83 (modeling historic access on an 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006) order and requiring a court
order supported by probable cause for prospective access); Our Principles, DIGITAL DUE
PROCESS, http://digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=99629E40-2551-11DF-8E02000C
296BA163 (last visited Mar. 27, 2013) (“A governmental entity may access, or may require
a covered entity to provide, prospectively or retrospectively, location information regarding
a mobile communications device only with a warrant issued based on a showing of probable
cause.”).
99
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY
RECORDS § 25-5.3(d).
100
See id. § 25-5.7(b) (requiring notice “[i]f the accessed record is highly or moderately
protected”). That notice “should generally occur within thirty days after acquisition,” id.,
but can be delayed, id. § 25-5.7(c).
101
See generally Stephen Wm. Smith, Gagged, Sealed & Delivered: Reforming ECPA’s
Secret Docket, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 313 (2012).
102
See Andrew E. Taslitz, Cybersurveillance Without Restraint? The Meaning and
Social Value of the Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion Standards in Government
Access to Third-Party Electronic Records, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 839 (2013).
103
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY
RECORDS §§ 25-5.2(a)(i), 25-5.3(a)(i).
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The final phrase, incorporating probable cause to believe the information
“will lead to evidence,” was added more out of an abundance of caution
than as an attempt to work a substantive change to traditional probable
cause analysis. 104 The addition was made during the second reading of the
Standards before the ABA Criminal Justice Council, when representatives
of the Department of Justice raised concerns regarding a magistrate opinion
from the District of Maryland. 105 In that opinion, Magistrate Judge Susan
Gauvey justified her refusal of a government request to track, via
surreptitious pinging of a mobile phone for a period of thirty days, the
location of the subject of an arrest warrant.106 As to the Standards, DOJ’s
proffered concern was that it would be unable to use location tracking to
locate a fugitive if probable cause were required. But a fugitive is
committing a crime in failing to surrender to authorities, and thus the
fugitive’s location is evidence of a crime: “Had the government’s request
included demonstration of the fugitive status of the subject of the arrest
warrant, the request would have been fairly routine.”107 The problem in the
Maryland case was not the requirement of a particular substantive standard
for the acquisition of location information, but rather the government’s
attempt to use inapposite authority 108 to obtain a very significant period of
location information without making even a colorable attempt to articulate
the need. 109 Despite denial of the government’s surveillance request, the
target was arrested a few days later.110
Under the LEATPR Standards, if the government wanted to locate a
fugitive, as opposed to tracking his or her location over a significant period,
the Standards would permit, among other options, a mere judicial
104
For a different proposal that makes this distinction very relevant, namely the
difference between reasonable suspicion and probable cause, see Christopher Slobogin,
Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory
Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 17–23 (2012). I
instead see the difference between those justification standards as a difference in confidence,
perhaps, for example, the difference between believing there is a 30% chance there are drugs
in a car and believing there is a 40% chance. Admittedly, as Andrew Taslitz explains, it is
difficult to comprehend what such percentages mean when they cannot easily be tied to
metaphor, see Taslitz, supra note 102, at 839, but perhaps the spectrum itself creates a
metaphor in this sense: relative judgments are possible from those benchmarks for which a
metaphor is readily available (e.g., a preponderance as a slight tipping of what were equally
balanced scales).
105
In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of
Location Info. of a Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526 (D. Md. 2011).
106
See id. at 530–32.
107
Id. at 537.
108
See id. at 536, 571–78.
109
See id. at 530, 532.
110
See id. at 532.
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determination of relevance or a prosecutorial certification of relevance. 111
More generally, it seems reasonable for law enforcement to acquire limited
location information in order to locate the target of an arrest warrant even if
that target is not believed to be a fugitive, 112 and Judge Gauvey recognized
that a legislature could perhaps authorize such law enforcement access. 113
It may also be reasonable if a person is merely believed to have relevant
information, meaning that locating that person “will lead to evidence of
crime,” to use the Standards’ language. More work is required to determine
what probable cause should mean in the context of location information114
and, more generally, in the context of record information. Whether it
should require a fair probability 115 that information contains evidence of
crime, or only a fair probability that information is relevant to an
investigation of crime is a worthy topic that is beyond the scope of this
Article. 116 Without that detailed analysis, it is impossible to appreciate how
significantly the latter might expand law enforcement authority or to
understand the benefits thereof.
D. ADMINISTRABILITY OF A “MOSAIC” APPROACH

Some commentators, foremost among them being Orin Kerr, have
raised very legitimate concerns with a “mosaic” approach in which a certain
law enforcement technique or access is not restricted, or has a lesser
restriction, but becomes restricted when law enforcement engages in too
much of it. 117 On the one hand, there is nothing novel in the
constitutionality of law enforcement conduct depending upon the totality of
law enforcement behavior and outside circumstances. This is true for such
commonplace considerations as whether police conduct constitutes a Fourth

111

See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
See In re Application, 849 F. Supp. 2d at 558–59, 564.
113
See id. at 530.
114
This issue has been raised before, including by Magistrate Judge Gauvey and other
magistrates considering requests for location information. See id. at 560–62 (discussing
Kerr’s testimony); In re Application of United States for an Order, 727 F. Supp. 2d 571,
580–85 (W.D. Tex. 2010) (discussing the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 in this regard);
Location Based Technologies Hearing, supra note 6, at 39–40 (2010) (testimony of
Professor Orin S. Kerr); Pell & Soghoian, supra note 3, at 155–56 (discussing both Judge
Gauvey’s opinion and Kerr’s testimony).
115
See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 246 (1983) (defining probable cause to
require a “fair probability”).
116
Note that in the example of Part I, placing the High Country Bandits near the
robberies is evidence of crime.
117
See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV.
311, 320 (2012).
112
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Amendment seizure requiring reasonable suspicion, 118 whether police
conduct constitutes a de facto Fourth Amendment arrest requiring probable
cause, 119 or whether a suspect is in “custody” such that Miranda warnings
are required. 120 Sometimes drawing a firearm will elevate a stop into a de
facto arrest and Miranda custody; other times it will be permissible as part
of a limited Terry stop. 121 And sometimes constitutionality, or at least
admissibility, depends upon what other officers have done, such as the
impact of an invocation of the Miranda right to counsel in an unrelated
interrogation. 122 And courts have long recognized the relevance of the
potential for large amounts of particular information to create a virtual
current biography of an individual. 123 Nonetheless, there is something
potentially novel, and certainly important, when it comes to tiered
restrictions on accessing location information.
Consider the proposal of the last section: accessing a record containing
more than a day of location information requires a court order resembling a
warrant, but accessing a day or less requires a lesser court order. Imagine
that an officer investigating a bank robbery wants to obtain the cell phone
location information of a suspect for the three-hour block surrounding the
robbery. Three hours are, of course, less than twenty-four, so a lesser court
order would seem sufficient. However, must the officer scour his or her
existing file to ensure that location information was not previously
requested? If twenty-two hours of location information were previously
requested, does this put the new request “over the top,” meaning a warrant
is required? Does the officer also have to check with fellow officers in the
department to see what they have obtained? With other departments? How
long does a previous access remain relevant? Does an access six days ago
“count”? Six weeks? Six years? 124
118

See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 202 (2002) (asking “whether a reasonable
person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
119
See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212–13 (1979) (looking to movement,
show of authority, and duration in differentiating a de facto arrest from a Terry stop).
120
See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440–42 (1984) (defining custody as when a
reasonable person would feel her freedom of movement had been curtailed to the degree
associated with a formal arrest).
121
See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 224, 234–36 (1985) (holding that
detention was a Terry stop despite drawing of service revolver).
122
See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682–85 (1988) (holding invocation effective
as against a different officer unaware of it).
123
See, e.g., Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino Cnty., 529 P.2d 590, 596 (Cal.
1974) (recognizing that “the totality of bank records provides a virtual current biography”).
124
Orin Kerr refers to this as the “duration and scale” “grouping” problem, and it strikes
me as the only truly novel circumstance of what he terms the mosaic approach. See Kerr,
supra note 117, at 333–34. I tend to think “grouping” across investigatory methods would
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Clearly a system that takes into account past requests in this manner, at
least without significant limitation, is not reasonably administrable. At the
same time, we would not want to permit an officer to game the system:
desiring three days worth of location, she requests twenty-four hours of
location on day one, the subsequent twenty-four hours on day two, and the
final twenty-four hours on day three, each time using the lesser restraint
applicable to shorter duration requests. In order to accommodate these
competing concerns, I would as a rule not require police to consider past
requests. If an officer seeks to obtain twenty-four hours or less of location
information, the lesser process requirement applies. However, if a court
finds the lesser process has been abused, appropriate sanctions should kick
in, potentially including suppression in any future criminal prosecution,
administrative discipline, civil penalties, and even criminal sanctions if the
violation were willful.125
An “abuse” trigger is not as easy to predict and administer as a brightline rule. Rather, it is a standard that will require some discretion in its
application, and at least until there is ample judicial precedent, there will be
some uncertainty on the margins. But it should provide adequate guidance
to law enforcement officers investigating in good faith, and it will achieve
the right result most of the time.
There remains a lingering ambiguity. Imagine an officer wants to
obtain a suspect’s location for a single hour of the day (say, 9:00 a.m. to
10:00 a.m.) for a period of two weeks. Is a record containing that
information, using the terms of the LEATPR Standards, highly or
moderately protected? In other words, does this count as fourteen hours of
location information, and therefore the record is moderately protected, or
does this count as over twenty-four hours of location information because it
pertains to many days? My preference would be to simply count the hours,
since time is typically the best measure of invasiveness with regard to
location information. Thus, I would consider such a record moderately
protected. Reasonable minds can disagree; what is critical is that a
decisionmaker considers and carefully delineates which rule would apply.
E. APPLICATION TO THE HIGH COUNTRY BANDITS

The High Country Bandits committed sixteen bank robberies. If police
not be worth the candle. See id. at 335–36.
125
The LEATPR Standards do not take a position on particular sanctions for particular
violations, instead providing only that “[t]he legislature should provide accountability for the
provisions governing access to and storage and disclosure of records maintained by
institutional third parties via appropriate criminal, civil, and/or evidentiary sanctions, and
appropriate periodic review and public reporting.” CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY RECORDS § 25-7.1 (2012).
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were content to obtain an hour of cell tower information for each robbery,
or several hours of information for several robberies, that would be less
than my posited twenty-four-hour threshold. Thus, under the LEATPR
Standards, the information might be moderately protected. But even those
lesser restrictions could not be satisfied. If the police had a suspect, they
could obtain the information for that suspect. But the police had no suspect.
Instead, when police in the actual investigation obtained cell tower
information for four of the robberies, they obtained information on 150,000
different subscribers. 126 Quite obviously, almost all of those persons were
entirely innocent of the crime. Assuming only two robbers, which was the
actual case, at least 99.999% of them were innocent. Assuming a large
group of ten robbers, at least 99.993% of them were innocent. Therefore, as
to the record pertaining to each of those 150,000 subscribers, even a
relevance threshold was not satisfied. Relevance is a very low substantive
standard, but it is nonetheless being used as a standard of individualized
suspicion. That some subscribers’ records are relevant to an investigation
does not permit police to obtain all subscribers’ records. 127
I earlier asserted that this acquisition of cell tower dumps was good
police work; using this technique police were able to solve serious crime
that was otherwise potentially unsolvable.128 Does this mean that we must
reduce the level of protection given to location information? Because, in
the Standards’ words, police are “unable to solve . . . an unacceptable
amount of otherwise solvable or preventable crime, such that the benefits of
respecting privacy are outweighed by this social cost”?129 Fortunately,
there is a better way that does not require this privacy hit, and that is
working with de-identified records.
F. DE-IDENTIFIED RECORDS AND THE HIGH COUNTRY BANDITS

The LEATPR Standards relate to law enforcement access to thirdparty records, where a record is defined as follows: “A record contains
information, whether maintained in paper, electronic, or other form, that is
linked, or is linkable through reasonable efforts, to an identifiable person.

126

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
In other words, imagine police believe a bank customer is engaged in money
laundering. Quite obviously that does not mean that the records of all bank customers are
relevant to that investigation merely because that vast swath of information will happen to
include relevant information. Otherwise, every record in existence would be “relevant” to a
criminal investigation for which they were all requested.
128
See supra Part I.A.
129
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY
RECORDS § 25-4.2(b).
127
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A ‘de-identified record’ contains information that is not so linkable.”130
There are important developments in the computer science and law of
de-identification, and those will be addressed in the Standards Commentary.
But for our purposes it is sufficient to understand that a “reasonable efforts”
standard is intended to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate both (1)
developments in the science of de-identification and re-identification and
(2) limited government resources. The danger of re-identification is very
significant when purportedly de-identified data will be accessible to the
public. But where the data will merely be accessible to law enforcement in
furtherance of a criminal investigation, and where that access, reidentification, retention, and future disclosure are all subject to other
constraints, the danger is far less significant. Thus, the particular manner of
de-identification need not be as robust as in other contexts.
What might constitute de-identification with respect to a cell tower
dump? The phone provider could simply replace every unique phone
number with a code. So, if the phone company records appeared as in
Tables 1 and 2, the de-identified records might appear as in Tables 3 and 4.
The only critical criterion for the labels is that where a phone number
appears more than once (in this case (899) 776-6369), it must of course be
given the same de-identified label every time (in this case C). For hundreds
of thousands of records the labels will appear more complicated, but the
concept remains the same.
Table 1
Cell Tower 95-1300
Registering Phone
(855) 943-3821
(844) 139-4185
(899) 776-6369
(855) 384-5528
(833) 728-6401

130

Id. § 25-1.1(g).

Time
9:32
9:33
9:35
9:35
9:36
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Table 2
Cell Tower 48-2700
Registering Phone
(822) 868-7328
(899) 024-2182
(844) 412-9589
(899) 776-6369
(899) 546-5222

Time
14:07
14:07
14:08
14:08
14:10

Table 3
De-Identified Cell Tower 95-1300
Registering Phone
A
B
C
D
E

Time
9:32
9:33
9:35
9:35
9:36

Table 4
De-Identified Cell Tower 48-2700
Registering Phone
F
G
H
C
I

Time
14:07
14:07
14:08
14:08
14:10

What would the Standards require of law enforcement in order to
obtain such de-identified records? According to Standard 25-5.6(a), “law
enforcement should be permitted to access an appropriately inclusive body
of de-identified records . . . pursuant to an official certification.” The
Standards require an “appropriately inclusive” set of records in order to
leverage the checks of the political process, and that is achieved where the
data includes every active cell phone for a number of different cell towers.
Persons of power and influence are potentially subject to this intrusion, and
therefore we can expect it to be the subject of debate and oversight.131 An
official certification requires “a written determination by a politically
accountable official that there is a reasonable possibility that the record is
131

See id. § 25-5.7(e) (requiring notice for the access of de-identified records).
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relevant to initiating or pursuing an investigation.”132 Not only is the
reasonable possibility threshold a very low one, but here the Standards are
specifically meant to permit searching through the haystack in order to find
the relevant needle, and therefore would permit the transfer in the
investigation of the High Country Bandits. 133
What would law enforcement do with the de-identified records?
Although in some circumstances algorithmic searches will be quite
complicated, in this instance it is very simple: compare the different cell
tower dumps to determine whether a certain de-identified label or labels are
present in multiple lists. Although the data was not de-identified, this is
otherwise precisely what FBI special agents did. The tower dump
information was entered into Microsoft Access, and the resulting tables
“were then queried for any cell phone numbers that were common between
the different robbery dates and cell tower locations.” 134 Using the
hypothetical de-identified data of Tables 3 and 4, law enforcement will find
a “hit” for cell phone “C.” Indeed, rather than complete the transfer, a
phone provider might run the query in its own records and report only
whether there was a “hit.” That selective revelation is exactly what the
Standards are attempting to achieve via de-identification.
The officers now have only a placeholder, rather than a phone number.
On what basis can they re-identify the data, i.e., learn from the phone
provider the number for phone “C”? Standard 25-5.6(b) provides, “A deidentified record should be linked to an identifiable person only if law
enforcement obtains the authorization required under Standard 25-5.3 for
the type or types of information involved. The showing for this
authorization may be based on a profile or algorithm.” 135 In this instance,
the record reflects location at a particular time. Thus, if location
information is moderately protected, then re-identification requires
satisfying the same standards for accessing moderately protected
information described above. In the High Country Bandits investigation, a
prosecutor could demonstrate either relevance or reasonable suspicion to a
court, as demonstrated by the criminal complaint:
[D]ue to the vast difference in distance and time between the cell towers and the dates
of the robberies, investigators believed that it would be extremely unusual for a cell
132

Id. § 25-5.2(c).
Admittedly, we probably could have done a better job in the blackletter of
differentiating the typical individualized relevance standard from this global reasonable
possibility of relevance standard. Fortunately, the entire design of the de-identification
provisions makes any other interpretation impossible.
134
Criminal Complaint, supra note 9, at 14.
135
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY
RECORDS § 25-5.6(b).
133
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phone number to appear on two or more of the cell phone towers servicing the area of
136
the bank[s] on the exact robbery dates.

For this process to function, third parties must be willing to perform
the requested de-identification, and thus a legislature enacting the Standards
might want to include such a requirement and reimbursement for costs. But
what if a third party is simply unable to perform the requested deidentification, or at least unable to do so without very significant expense?
It is within the spirit of the Standards to permit other alternatives that
accomplish the same ends. For example, in 2005, police in Rotterdam,
Netherlands, wanted to identify those involved in a riot.137 They obtained
from phone providers the 17,000 mobile telephone numbers corresponding
to phones known to be in the vicinity. Police sent a text message to every
number, requesting that anyone with information on the riots contact the
police. The police then deleted the database of numbers. 138 It would be
important that the message convey its “appropriately inclusive” breadth.
For example, it might state as follows:
Based on telephone provider records that we are using solely for this purpose (and our
sole copy of which will be deleted once this is sent), we have reason to believe you
were one of the thousands of persons near the Rotterdam riots on [whatever date]. If
you have any information on the riots or on specific rioters, please contact the police
at [contact information].

Assuming such a properly informative and nonthreatening message,
this seems a smart investigatory tool that is respectful of privacy, and one
that is within the spirit of the Standards.139
To the contrary was a law enforcement request that was recently
denied in the Southern District of Texas.140 Magistrate Judge Brian Owsley
rejected four applications for cell tower dumps in which neither the
prosecutor nor the special agent seemed to understand the relevant
136

Criminal Complaint, supra note 9, at 13–14. Neither reasonable suspicion nor the
more demanding probable cause requires precise quantification of probability. But see Erica
Goldberg, Getting Beyond Intuition in the Probable Cause Inquiry, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 48–49) (arguing that a precise probability should be
determinative when it can be calculated).
137
See BRUCE SCHNEIER, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY 28 (2008).
138
The Standards require ultimate deletion of all de-identified records. See CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY RECORDS § 25-6.1(c).
139
The text message actually used by Rotterdam police may have been deficient. See
David Rennie, Dutch Hooligans Rounded up by Text, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 1, 2005, 12:01
AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/netherlands/1497387/Dutchhooligans-rounded-up-by-text.html (describing it as a “terse message . . . informing users
that they were known to have been in the vicinity”).
140
In re Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)
Directing Providers to Provide Historical Cell Site Location Records, C.R. Nos. C-12670M–673M, 2012 WL 4717778, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2012).
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technology, there was no coherent explanation of how the data would be
used to identify the perpetrator, and there was no promise to ignore and
then destroy irrelevant data. 141 Quite obviously the LEATPR Standards
provide a better solution.
III. REAL-TIME LOCATION SURVEILLANCE
Part II describes how the ABA LEATPR Standards would apply to law
enforcement accessing historic location information from a private service
provider in nonexigent and nonconsensual circumstances. 142 The Standards
do not apply to real-time surveillance by a law enforcement officer, either
via the naked eye or with the assistance of technology. 143 However, the
initial default position should be the same level of restriction, because the
law enforcement need and the privacy intrusion are the same. Whether
police receive my location information as I “create” it or a week later,
assuming the same level of detail for both, the information—and therefore
the benefit to law enforcement and the privacy implications—are identical.
Thus, it is not surprising that requests for wiretaps (real-time surveillance)
are plummeting now that police often have alternative means of acquiring
the same or equivalent information that are statutorily less restricted. 144
That differentiation is a mistake; Fourth Amendment and statutory
restrictions should typically be the same for real-time and historic access.
Thus, for real-time location tracking that is technologically assisted, as
via a GPS tracking device or a drone, the same standards developed above
should apply. Under the developed assumptions, law enforcement tracking
for more than a day would require a warrant supported by probable cause;
nonexigent law enforcement tracking for less than a day would require a
lesser court order. 145 There might also be apt analogues to de-identified
historic access. For example, if unmanned aerial vehicles are used to
monitor a multiday protest, perhaps—as with airport screeners—they can
be configured to eliminate personally identifying details, showing only
generic body shapes, unless and until such details become relevant. 146 On
141

See id. at *1, *4.
It should be stressed that the relevant consent is not that of the service provider but
rather is that of the subscriber. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY RECORDS § 25-5.1.
143
See id. § 25-2.1(e).
144
See Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J.
1309, 1322–25 (2012); Lichtblau, supra note 34.
145
There would not seem to be an equivalent to obtaining a store receipt that reveals
location at only a single point in time.
146
See Katie Johnston, A Modest Solution: TSA Is Replacing Body Scanners that Drew
Privacy Complaints, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 5, 2012, at B5, B8 (describing privacy-protective
airport screeners); Joe Sharkey, A Farewell to ‘Nudity’ at Airport Checkpoints, N.Y. TIMES,
142
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the other hand, even such “de-identified” aerial observation could be
intimidating and have a chilling effect on First Amendment protected
activity. There are many issues to work through, and for now as to realtime surveillance I am content to begin the construction of a potential
framework. 147
What of real-time location surveillance that is not technologically
assisted? My default is of course equal treatment for real-time and historic
access. And because the privacy intrusion is tied to the amount of location
information much more fundamentally than to the means of gathering, my
preference, like that of Christopher Slobogin, is to vary the regulation solely
by time. 148 But the default of equal treatment for real-time and historic
access should be trumped when there is good reason, and in this instance
there is a terrific reason. It would be devastating to legitimate law
enforcement, and even downright silly, if a police officer had to get a court
order before looking at a person and thereby determining his or her
location.
So, what restraint should apply to visual surveillance by the naked
eye? My tendency is to permit police the lesser period of visual
surveillance, twenty-four hours or less, without restraint.149 More precisely,
the only restraint would be that which applies to all law enforcement
conduct, namely that there be some legitimate law enforcement purpose. 150
This would include purposes as diverse as training and “staying current” in
order to be aware of potential needs for law enforcement assistance, but
Jan. 22, 2013, at B6 (describing removal of intrusive screeners from airports).
147
A typical consideration is that technologically assisted police surveillance is of
greater concern because technology eliminates previously significant resource restraints on
prolonged surveillance. As explained by Justice Alito in United States v. Jones:
In the pre-computer age, the greatest protections of privacy were neither constitutional nor
statutory, but practical. Traditional surveillance for any extended period of time was difficult
and costly and therefore rarely undertaken. The surveillance at issue in this case—constant
monitoring of the location of a vehicle for four weeks—would have required a large team of
agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance. Only an investigation of unusual
importance could have justified such an expenditure of law enforcement resources. Devices like
the one used in the present case, however, make long-term monitoring relatively easy and cheap.

132 S. Ct. 945, 963–64 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). The elimination of
former resource restraints is most relevant if the baseline is no restriction. Because my
proposal would restrain law enforcement location surveillance even if not technologically
assisted, this resource distinction is much less important.
148
See Slobogin, supra note 104, at 24–27, 35.
149
Slobogin’s solution is the same but more restrictive, limiting “targeted public”
viewing of persons to twenty minutes without a court order. See id. at 25, 27. He of course
recognizes an exception for exigent circumstances. See id.
150
See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY
RECORDS § 25-5.3(d) (2012).
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would not, for example, include following a particularly attractive person.
One could reasonably argue that the twenty-four hours is too long a period
to be without court regulation, especially when spread into single-hour
intervals over many days, in which case perhaps the limit should instead be
twelve hours. Either way, longer periods of surveillance would require
additional restraint, and here I would apply the default same-as-historic
rule. Thus, surveillance longer than twenty-four hours would require a
court order supported by probable cause. If a jurisdiction were to adopt the
lesser period of unregulated visual surveillance, then surveillance of more
than twelve hours up to twenty-four hours would require a lesser court
order. These two options are depicted in Tables 5 and 6.
Table 5
Visual Surveillance Option 1
Duration
≤ 24 hours
> 24 hours

Regulation
Legitimate law enforcement purpose
Warrant

Table 6
Visual Surveillance Option 2
Duration
≤ 12 hours
12 hours < duration ≤ 24 hours
> 24 hours

Regulation
Legitimate law enforcement purpose
Lesser court order
Warrant

Under this construct we once again have the mosaic concern. Can an
officer look upon this person today if the officer watched him or her last
week? I would resolve the concern in the same manner as for historic
surveillance. Law enforcement can engage in independent twenty-fourhour (or twelve-hour) periods of surveillance without restraint; if a court
finds an abuse of this no-court-order process, appropriate sanctions should
apply.
This works a change in traditional Fourth Amendment law: the
Supreme Court “has to date not deviated from the understanding that mere
visual observation does not constitute a search.” 151 But that is a history that
has always been wanting and that has received very little development by
the Court. Naked-eye surveillance is sufficiently intimidating that we
regulate it via the laws of harassment and stalking, and as Christopher
Slobogin, Andrew Taslitz, and others have developed, it certainly affects

151

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953.
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the security of our persons. 152 While I thus strongly believe that there
should be Fourth Amendment restriction on extended stakeouts and
undercover operations, there can of course be legislative and administrative
restraints even in its absence.
A legislature, police officer, or court determining “abuse” will have to
confront some nuanced issues that, at least as matters of first impression,
might be difficult. For example, say an officer is watching over a park
during a multiday “Occupy” protest.153 Must the officer obtain a warrant
because he is likely to view the same person over multiple days and realizes
this in advance? I would think not, just as I would not require a court order
when an officer executing his rounds realizes he will see the same persons
at the same locations day after day because they too are going about their
predictable daily routines. But how is the law to demarcate such
permissible surveillance from impermissible long-term surveillance?
We have already seen a solution, only it does not work for naked-eye
visual surveillance: we would like to de-identify the information, and
permit access to appropriately inclusive bodies of such de-identified
information subject only to the checks of the political process.154 We are
not concerned about police happening to see certain persons in the
performance of their duties, but we do not want them watching a single
person or home over a long period without judicial preclearance. Because
we cannot “de-identify” persons whom an officer sees—we cannot program
eyeballs to only see bodily outlines, for example—we need an alternative
basis for differentiating the unrestricted from the restricted that will get
much the same result. Perhaps the question to ask is whether a reasonable
officer would believe the police were systematically collecting information
regarding a particular individual or individuals. If so, and if that
information will be location information for more than twenty-four hours
(or twelve hours under Option 2 (see Table 6)), police must seek a court
order. If not, then the conduct is permissible for any legitimate law
enforcement purpose. Christopher Slobogin has proposed essentially this
152

See Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and
the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 237–251 (2002); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth
Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 169–74 (2002). Visual surveillance is regulated in other
countries. See Susan Freiwald & Sylvain Métille, Reforming Surveillance Law: The Swiss
Model, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at Sec. G (Physical
Observations)).
153
See Michael S. Schmidt, For Occupy Movement, a Challenge to Recapture
Momentum, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2012, at A21.
154
For an explanation of the benefits of process, see Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New
Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56
MERCER L. REV. 507, 554–59 (2005).
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solution, where he differentiates between “general” and “targeted”
searches. 155
Because for years we have had little to no restriction on law
enforcement naked-eye observation, momentum favors something like this
model. Visual surveillance for some period is restrained only by the
requirement of a legitimate law enforcement purpose; technologically
assisted surveillance for that period is regulated just like that same period of
historic records access. Visual surveillance, technologically assisted
surveillance, and historic records access for a longer period all receive the
same greater restraint.
IV. A FEW THOUGHTS ON PROCESS
Scholars are now crafting specific proposals in the wake of United
States v. Jones, and in some sense this task will never be complete. No
matter what the courts and legislatures decide, there will be room for
improvement, and changing technologies and social norms require changing
laws. 156 Naturally, better solutions require robust and open participation
and debate, and a critical component is active and engaged participation by
law enforcement. 157 This is not to say that law enforcement is the only
155

Slobogin, supra note 104, at 16–32. “A targeted search seeks to obtain information
about a specific person or circumscribed place. A general search seeks to obtain
information about people or places that are not targets at the time of the search.” Id. at 17.
The Swiss system makes a similar differentiation. See Freiwald & Métille, supra note 152.
156
Although commentators disagree on what the solution should be, we seem united in
recognizing that changing technologies require reevaluation of existing rules. See, e.g., Orin
S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV.
476 (2011) (arguing that the courts have traditionally recalibrated Fourth Amendment rules
to account for changing technologies); Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web
and Other Fourth Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614,
619 (2011) (arguing for a principle of “technosocial continuity” in which “courts consider
both the ways in which technology facilitates intrusive surveillance and the ways in which
technology spurs social change that may make citizens more vulnerable to existing
surveillance technologies”).
157
For a helpful account of some instances in which engaged debate has improved
security and privacy, see Jeffrey Rosen, Naked Scanners, GPS Tracking, and Private
Citizens: Technology’s Role in Balancing Security and Privacy, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (2011).
Kurt Schmid, Executive Director of the Chicago High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
Program, points out a slightly different way in which dialogue can benefit law enforcement:
The law enforcement community has repeatedly learned that the criminal quickly adapts new
technologies to his repertoire of tools not only to enhance his illicit activities, but also to create—
and we hope only a temporary—safe haven in which to operate. Law enforcement, generally
lagging the technological capability and/or the legal precedent to intercept or access
communication and data, must deal with these difficult situations for sometimes long periods of
time before solutions are found. Opportunities to sit at the table with industry, privacy
advocates, and lawmakers prior to major technology rollouts are crucial to preventing sometimes
years of unintended consequences.
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critical participant in the discussion. For example, Andrew Taslitz urges
the participation of those governed by, and particularly those most affected
by, police conduct.158 But because the law enforcement community
sometimes seems hesitant or even unwilling to participate in this
conversation, I comment briefly upon that need.
In order to draft the ABA LEATPR Standards, it was essential to hear
from representatives of law enforcement. Although there were absolutely
differences of opinion on precisely where to draw the privacy versus safety
line, most often the differences instead concerned whether a particular
proposal would affect that line. This is something that is impossible to
know without input from both “sides,” meaning from law enforcement
officers and prosecutors on one side, and from defense attorneys and
privacy advocates on the other. Theory is wonderful, and as law professors
we engage in a great deal of it, but we—or at least most of us—ultimately
hope to ground that theory by carefully considering how it will apply in the
real world. This requires knowing as much as possible about everyday
events and policing.
In some countries police might actively press legislative discussion
because it suits their law enforcement interest: the default is that they
cannot use an investigative procedure, meaning that absent affirmative
legislative authorization, police are not permitted to so operate. 159 Because
the default in the United States is the contrary, permitting police to do what
the legislature has not prohibited, there is an understandable tendency
among some in law enforcement to avoid drawing attention to tactics that
might, if considered, be regulated. Of course, any search or seizure can be
constitutionally regulated, and perhaps there is a slightly greater risk of
such constitutional regulation if a legislature does not step in first. But that
is a slight risk, and an American officer might plausibly figure that an
investigative technique that does not draw attention will not draw
regulation, and that allows for getting more bad guys and gals off the
ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
111–49 (2010) (testimony of Kurt F. Schmid, Director, Chicago High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Area Program).
158
See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Criminal Republic: Democratic Breakdown as a Cause of
Mass Incarceration, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 133 (2011) (arguing that real deliberative
processes increase public support for the justice system and foster more pragmatic, less
punitive responses); Andrew E. Taslitz, Fourth Amendment Federalism and the Silencing of
the American Poor, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 277 (2010) (arguing for increased participation by
poor racial minorities); Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Auditors and the Fourth Amendment:
Data with the Power to Inspire Political Action, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221 (2003)
(arguing for “racial auditing” as a method of police regulation).
159
See, e.g., Freiwald & Métille, supra note 152 (describing the Swiss default).
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streets, which keeps us all safe. As a criminal analyst for the state of Iowa
said about cell phone location tracking, “We find people, and it saves
lives.” 160
Thus, the Iowa City Police Department warns officers to keep cell
phone tracking out of reports, and further cautions as follows: “Do not
mention to the public or the media the use of cellphone technology or
equipment used to locate the targeted subject.” 161 In a provocative recent
article, federal Magistrate Judge Stephen William Smith of the Southern
District of Texas explains how the current system of sealing government
surveillance requests severely limits our understanding of what is taking
place:
Through a potent mix of indefinite sealing, nondisclosure (i.e., gagging), and delayednotice provisions, . . . surveillance orders all but vanish into a legal void. It is as if
they were written in invisible ink—legible to the phone companies and Internet
service providers who execute them, yet imperceptible to unsuspecting targets, the
general public, and even other arms of government, most notably Congress and the
162
appellate courts.

Quite obviously such lack of information is not conducive to the best
minds being able to deliberate the best solutions, and hopefully law
enforcement can increasingly be persuaded to bring to the table their
expertise and experiences, such that all of the relevant actors—from the
police to the courts to the legislatures to the academics—will have more
information. Ideally law enforcement will actively seek legislation that
provides the authorization they require, rather than seek to operate in its
absence. At the very least, we can hope to do better than the view
expressed by Governor Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island in vetoing a law
restricting law enforcement searches of cell phones. “The courts,” claimed
Governor Chafee, “and not the legislature, are better suited to resolve these
complex and case specific issues.” 163 It is a particular shame to see an
160
Eric Lichtblau, Police Are Using Phone Tracking as a Routine Tool: Cell Companies
Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2012, at 1.
161
Id. For a complementary view that police are reticent to discuss these techniques, see
Pell & Soghoian, supra note 3, at 158.
162
Smith, supra note 101, at 602.
163
Letter from Lincoln D. Chafee, Governor, to Speaker of the House of Representatives
(June 25, 2012), available at http://www.governor.ri.gov/documents/Vetoes/Veto Message
12-H 7110.pdf; see also Sengupta, supra note 87, at A1. Governor Jerry Brown of
California expressed the same sentiment in vetoing a similar California law. See Amy
Gahran, California Governor Allows Warrantless Search of Cell Phones, CNN (Oct. 11,
2011, 12:31 PM), articles.cnn.com/2011-10-11/tech/tech_mobile_california-phone-searchveto_1_cell-phones-smartphone-text-messages (“The courts are better suited to resolve the
complex and case-specific issues relating to constitutional search-and-seizures protections.”)
(quoting Governor Brown’s statement).
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executive declare such a backwards theory when his legislature had acted;
legislatures far too often abdicate their role, leaving the regulation of
criminal investigations to the courts’ constitutional analysis in the first
instance.
V. CONCLUSION
My colleague Joseph Thai and I run a service for criminal law and
procedure professors in which we gather, categorize, analyze, and make
available multimedia materials for classroom use. 164 We often regret that
so much of the material chronicles bad law enforcement behavior. While
there is certainly much to learn from such mistakes, focusing solely on
mistakes does a disservice to the many conscientious law enforcement
agents around the country who are actively working not only to remain
within the law, but to act in the best spirit of that law. But for obvious
reasons such praiseworthy conduct is less likely to be chronicled in the
news, and thus we are beginning to actively seek it out. It is in that same
vein that I consider the investigation of the High Country Bandits
chronicled in this Article. It is an example of terrific police work. By
developing a system of thoughtful regulation that takes advantage of deidentification, this Article demonstrates that we can permit such
investigation and very effectively protect our privacy, making us secure in
our persons, houses, papers, and effects, and thus fulfilling the promise and
purpose of the Fourth Amendment. If we can encourage police to
participate actively in dialogue and to be more than reactive in the
legislative process, it is possible to achieve the twin aims of safety and
privacy that bring security.
While obviously I find value in the particular solutions I proffer for
regulating law enforcement access to location information, the most
significant value of the ABA LEATPR Standards is their provision of a
thoughtful framework through which interested parties can arrive at their
own desired solution. I encourage decisionmakers at all levels and in all
roles—police departments, prosecutors’ offices, legislatures, and courts—to
take advantage of that framework as they make the difficult decisions of
how best to regulate law enforcement access to information in the era of
Big Data. 165
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